A CONSERVATIVE EMBRACE? EVALUATING PAKISTAN’S IIAS THROUGH EXPROPRIATION, FET, MFN, AND ISDS PROVISIONS

Abstract

This article evaluates Pakistan’s International Investment Agreements (IIAs) through the lens of four key provisions: expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET), most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The research aims to assess whether these provisions reflect a conservative approach that prioritizes investor protection at the potential expense of national sovereignty and regulatory autonomy. The study employs a doctrinal research methodology, analyzing Pakistan’s IIAs and the implications of these provisions on the state's ability to regulate in the public interest. Key findings suggest that while the expropriation and FET clauses provide strong protection for foreign investors, they also limit Pakistan’s capacity to enact necessary policies in sectors like public health and environmental protection. Additionally, the MFN clause may expose Pakistan to unintended consequences, such as diminished bargaining power in future negotiations. The ISDS mechanism, while beneficial for investor protection, poses significant concerns regarding sovereignty, as it allows foreign investors to bypass national courts. Overall, the study concludes that Pakistan’s IIAs exhibit a conservative embrace of investor protection, which may undermine its ability to regulate in a way that balances investment interests with public policy goals.

Keywords: foreign investment, regulatory autonomy, investor protection, dispute resolution, sovereignty, international law